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REPLY ESSAYS 
CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY.AND 
EMPIRICAL DATA: A RESPONSE 
TO PROFESSOR HEISE 
Carl Tobiast 
One decade ago, Congress undertook an ambitious, controversial 
effort to reduce expense and delay in the federal civil justice system. 
The Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA") of 1990 instituted unprece-
dented nationwide experimentation by requiring that all ninety-four 
federal district courts scrutinize their civil and criminal dockets and 
then promulgate and apply numerous procedures which district judges 
believed would save cost and time in civil litigation.1 Congress also 
prescribed rigorous assessment of the six principles, guidelines, and 
techniques of litigation management and expense and delay reduction 
that federal districts in fact adopted and enforced. Lawmakers pro-
vided for an expert, independent evaluator that was to collect, ana-
lyze, and synthesize s1stematically relevant empirical data on certain 
aspects of the testing. Moreover, legislators requested that the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, the policymaking arm for the 
federal courts, study additional features of experimentation, which 
principally implicated differentiated case management ("DCM") and 
various forms of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). Congress 
asked that the Judicial Conference submit a report and recommenda-
t Professor ofl.aw, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I 
wish to thank Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Angeline Garbett for 
processing this piece, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. I am a member of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the U.S. District Court for the District of Mon-
tana; however, the views expressed here and errors that remain are mine. 
1 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994). See generally Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: 
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1447 (1994) (analyzing the CJRA and 
arguing that it neither compels nor authorizes district courts to adopt procedural rules inconsis-
tent with existing law); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 
46 STAN. L. REv. 1589 (1994) (analyzing the conflicting objectives of CJRA and its predeces-
sor, the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988). 
2 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat 5089, 
5097-98 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994)) (requiring submission of a 
report to Congress assessing the extent to which costs and delays were reduced as a result of a 
pilot program). The RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice assessed the measures that 
ten pilot districts applied. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (defining the six principles, guidelines, and 
techniques of litigation management and cost and delay reduction). 
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tions to lawmakers and the president on both dimensions of the test-
ing which the federal districts had conducted.3 
Congress mandated implementation of this national experiment, 
which it intended to conserve fiscal and temporal resources, even 
though minimal empirical data demonstrated that the federal district 
courts actually experienced serious delay when resolving civil dis-
putes. A thorough study released during 1990, for example, found 
considerably less delay in terms of time to disposition than many fed-
eral courts observers had contended, thereby seeming to confirm the 
proposition that resolution times in the federal districts had remained 
comparatively constant over the preceding twenty years.4 Insofar as 
delay did exist, the periods needed for concluding civil lawsuits ap-
peared to vary significantly across the districts.5 Delay is a relative 
concept.6 For instance, it seems inappropriate to characterize as delay 
the time that resource-poor litigants consume in developing the fac-
tual information those parties need to prove their cases.7 Precisely 
how slow is too slow remains unclear. Furthermore, Congress pre-
scribed effectuation of this expansive, costly experiment with meas-
ures for decreasing expense and delay in civil litigation, even though 
similar efforts in numerous states and in a significant number of fed-
eral districts suggested that the courts had exhausted practicalll all of 
the advantages that they could derive from procedural reforms. 
3 See Civil Justice Reform Act§ 104 (calling for a report on the results of the demonstra-
tion program that experiments with DCM and ADR systems). The Judicial Conference assessed 
the measures that five demonstration districts applied. See id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) 
(authorizing the Judicial Conference as the policymaking arm for the federal courts). 
4 See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990). See also TERENCE DUNGWORTH & 
NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND CORPORATION, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 25 (1990) (contending that no evidence substantiated the assertion that 
time to disposition had increased). 
5 See, e.g., Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Couns, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 99, 101 (observing that, while variations exist 
among the districts, no study has described why some do well in moving cases and others do 
poorly). See also Lauren Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Couns, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. ll5, 122 (1991) (same). 
6 See, e.g., Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Refonn: Juggling Between Politics and Per-
fection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 849-51 (1994) (discussing problems created by a lack of 
common understanding of delay); Robel, supra note 5, at 117-23 (observing the need to rethink 
the definition of the delay problem). 
7 See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Refonn and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Proce-
dure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1423 (1992) (arguing that "individuals who lack resources and 
information need greater, rather than less, discovery"). See also Robel, supra note 5, at 121 
n.37 (noting that public interest litigants cited delay most frequently when asked their greatest 
criticism of the litigation process). 
8 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 
FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF COST AND DELAY AsSESSMENT 
OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES & TECHNIQUES (1997), reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997) (herein-
after JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Refonn Sunset, 
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 599. 
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It should not have been surprising, therefore, that the compre-
hensive evaluation, which the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND 
Corporation performed at the instruction of Congress, ascertained that 
the judicial case management mechanisms prescribed and imple-
mented by districts pursuant to CJRA may have saved some time but 
only minimally reduced cost in civil cases.9 Moreover, the Judicial 
Conference rejected extension of the six statutorily-enumerated prin-
ciples, guidelines, and techniques of litigation management and ex-
pense and delay reduction beyond the ten pilot federal district courts 
that experimented with these approaches. The Judicial Conference 
correspondingly suggested an alternative program to conserve eco-
nomic and temporal resources.10 
During 1996, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
the Civil Rules appointed a Discovery Subcommittee to explore 
whether those provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that 
govern discovery required amendment. 11 The Discovery Subcom-
mittee astutely commissioned studies by the RAND Corporation In-
stitute for Civil Justice, which had recently concluded a thoroughgo-
ing assessment of the principles, guidelines, and techniques for d_e-
creasing cost and delay applied by pilot districts under CJRA, and by 
the Federal Judicial Center, the principal research arm of the federal 
courts, which had primary responsibility for preparing the analyses of 
the measures enforced by the CJRA demonstration districts. 12 The 
new evaluations, which expanded on the empirical data that RAND 
and the Federal Judicial Center had assembled, assessed and synthe-
sized in the CJRA effort, found that discovery functioned compara-
tively well as a general matter and created the greatest difficulty in a 
9 See James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial 
Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 18, 41 (1997) 
(finding that the pilot program had little impact on litigation cost savings and time to disposi-
tion). See also infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
10 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 89-90 (''Because this pilot project, 
as a package, did not have a great impact on reducing cost and delay, the Judicial Conference 
does not recommend that it be applied nationally."). See generally Carl Tobias, The Judicial 
Conference Report and the Conclusion of Federal Civil Justice Reform, 175 F.R.D. 351 (1998) 
(assessing the Judicial Conference Report and suggesting prompt resolution, preferably by 
Congress, of the question of whether CJRA has expired). 
11 See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to 
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 24, 25 
(1998). See also Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules 
Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 521 (1998) (describing appointment and 
activities of subcommittee). 
12 See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998) (reporting the results of the fol-
low-up RAND study); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclo-
sure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998) (reporting 
results of the FJC study). See also Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory 
Comm. on Civil Rules, to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure, 192 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (2000) (discussing the subcommittee's response to the results of 
the studies); supra notes 2-3, 9-10 and accompanying text. 
238 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:235 
rather small percentage of relatively complex cases.13 Notwithstand-
ing these instructive findings, the Judicial Conference substantially 
modified several significant features of pretrial discovery, a process 
which is essential to modern civil litigation. The Conference insti-
tuted important changes for all civil lawsuits in the scope of discovery 
and in the strictures that cover mandatory prediscovery disclosure.14 
These two vignettes of contemporary public policymaking in the 
areas of federal civil justice reform and federal civil procedure resist 
easy understanding and might even appear to be somewhat counter-
intuitive. Nevertheless, a recent law review article, 15 authored by 
Professor Michael Heise, illuminates those stories and informs our 
understanding of the federal and state civil justice systems more 
broadly. 
All of the propositions above mean that Professor Heise's valu-
able contribution deserves a response. This essay undertakes that ef-
fort. The initial section of the paper provides a comparatively brief 
descriptive assessment of Justice Delayed?. The second part of this 
Response considers how Professor Heise enhances our appreciation 
of the two initiatives examined above and of civil justice reform gen-
erally. The third part offers a number of recommendations for future 
treatment of the federal and state civil justice processes. 
I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Justice Delayed? significantly advances understanding of the 
federal and state civil justice systems. Professor Heise first places the 
issue of civil justice delay in its broader historical context and exam-
ines earlier attempts to collect empirical data on the question. The 
author finds that undue delay has persisted as a complication that 
frustrates the administration of civil justice, "desrite well-intentioned 
reform efforts to reduce" case disposition time. 1 The difficulty has 
received minimal assessment, primarily because informative data are 
13 See Kakalik et al., supra note 12, at 682 ("'The empirical data show that any problems 
that may exist with discovery are concentrated in a minority of the cases, and the evidence indi-
cates that discovery costs can be very high in some cases."); Willging et al., supra note 12, at 
534-35 (same). A National Center for State Courts study of discovery in five states reached 
somewhat similar conclusions. See Susan Keilitz et al., Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts 
Out of Control?, STATE CT. J., Spring 1993, at 8, 14 (finding that discovery is conducted less 
frequently than presumed). But see John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal 
Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REv. 505, 506-09 (2000) (demonstrating empirically that discovery disputes 
occur in significantly greater numbers now than in the past). 
14 See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 344-46 (U.S. 
2000). See generally Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 75, 79-84 (2000) (critically assessing the amendments and evaluating their 
potential effects). 
15 Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition 
Time, 50 CASEW. REs. L. REV. 813 (2000). 
16 See id. at 818. See generally supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. 
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somewhat scarce and numerous intrinsic complexities attend the re-
search issue.17 The problem of undue delay, or at least its perception, 
has prompted serious, successive attempts to expedite case resolution 
since the mid-twentieth century.18 Nonetheless, initiatives that have 
closely evaluated the impacts of the various reforms instituted on dis-
position time have generally detected minimal direct, systematic ef-
fect.19 . 
Professor Heise determines that ambivalence characterizes the 
relationship between empirical research and the attempts of public 
policymakers to improve the civil justice system.20 He ascertains that 
"little comprehensive data exist that inform many civil justice reform 
efforts."21 He also describes "one recent and notable exception" to 
this dearth of assessments-the evaluation conducted by the RAND 
Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice of the pilot program effectu-
ated under CJRA. This analysis, according to Professor Heise, "rep-
resents the most recent large-scale empirical study of this country's 
civil justice system. "22 
17 See Heise, supra note 15, at 818 ('The problem remains understudied principally due to 
the relative scarcity of helpful data as well as the research question's inherent complexities."). 
See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REY. 374, 419-21 (1982) (argu-
ing that judicial management of civil litigation is difficult to evaluate because data collection at 
the trial court level is a recent phenomenon, current empirical research techniques are inaccu-
rate, and valid comparisons between districts are not always possible); Michael J. Saks, Do We 
Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992) (arguing that existing empirical research is inadequate for 
drawing reliable conclusions about the litigation process). 
18 See Heise, supra note 15, at 818. See also HANS ZEISEL ET AL, DELAY IN THE COURT 
71-81 (1959) (discussing one method for reducing delay by shifting jury trials to shorter bench 
trials). See generally George L. Priest, Private litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 527, 527 (1989) (arguing that little understanding of litigation delay exists despite 
it being the focus ofintense studies and reform efforts since the 1950s). 
19 See Heise, supra note 15, at 818. See generally THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR. ET AL, 
PRETRIAL DELAY: A REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 45 (1978) ("Attempts to reduce delay 
through special programs, conferencing devices, diversion and other procedural tinkering have 
seldom proved themselves in practice."); BARRY MAHONEY ET AL, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL 
COURTS: CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 193 
(1988) (finding that the use of alternative dispute resolution programs is not correlated with 
faster processing of cases). 
20 See Heise, supra note 15, at 818-19. See generally Bryant G. Garth, Observations on 
an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 
103, 103 (1997) (arguing that the results of empirical research regarding litigation reform are 
misunderstood and suggesting use of a different type of research better suited to reform efforts). 
21 Heise, supra note 15, at 819. See generally Deborah J. Merritt & Kathryn A. Barry, Is 
the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 315 (1999) (offering the 
first comprehensive investigation of product liability and medical malpractice verdicts-tWo of 
the more controversial areas of recovery in the tort reform movement-that permits complex 
statistical analyses of tort verdicts); supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
22 Heise, supra note 15, at 819-20. See generally Kakalik et al., supra note 9 (describing 
the implementation of the CJRA program and summarizing the results of the RAND study on 
the effects of the CJRA' s case management policies); A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case 
Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Refonn Act of 1990, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
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Professor Heise observes that the RAND assessment, which 
clearly concluded that the CJRA's "efficacy is mixed, at best," has 
already provoked considerable lively debate in the academic litera-
ture.23 The RAND Corporation researchers determined that, on the 
whole, the "pilot program, as the package was implemented, had little 
effect on time to disposition," although the investigators associated 
particular case management practices with "significantly reduced time 
to disposition."24 He ascertains that the RAND results are limited b~ 
specific considerations that implicate the research design employed 
and by a number of problems that accompany any effort when evalu-
ators have not yet established common metrics.26 Despite any techni-
cal questions that might restrict the validity of the RAND conclu-
sions, Professor Heise remarks that this entity's overall finding that 
the "CJRA program did not systematically reduce case disposition 
time comports with the weight of prior research.'m 
After setting the issue of civil justice delay in context, the writer 
explores the need for better comprehension of the civil justice system 
by analyzing potential determinants of time to disposition for civil 
disputes that culminate in a jury trial. Professor Heise invokes em-
pirical data that the National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") and 
the United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics 
("BJS") recently collected, evaluated, and synthesized during a study 
which explored one year of outcomes in civil lawsuits that reached 
jury trials in forty-five of the seventy-five heaviest-populated counties 
in the United States.28 He considers geographic locale, party compo-
877, 900-05 (1993) (arguing that the research provided for by CJRA will not yield adequate 
information for developing new policy). 
23 See Heise, supra note 15, at 820. See generally John Burritt McArthur, Inter-Branch 
Politics and the Judicial Resistance to Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 551 
(1999) (critically evaluating the CJRA as a failure in most respects); Symposium, Evaluation of 
the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
24 Kakalik et al., supra note 9, at 18, 41. See also Heise, supra note 15, at 820; Tobias, 
supra note 8, at 593 (describing some of the case management practices adopted by specific 
districts). 
25 See Heise, supra note 15, at 820. See generally McArthur, supra note 23, at 633-34 
(arguing for a more carefully constructed experimental design than that used by CJRA). 
26 See Heise, supra note 15, at 820. Professor Heise identifies four specific problems: (1) 
the pilot program's small sample size, (2) potential selection bias involving the pilot and control 
courts, (3) treatment effect issues, and (4) the limited aspect of the Civil Justice Reform Act 
program assessed. See id. at 821-22. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Proce-
dural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 239-40 (1997) (arguing that 
a systematic body of knowledge in this area is needed because, in the past, assertions regarding 
civil procedure reform have been based upon hunches or theories); Jeffrey J. Connaughton, 
Judicial Accountability and the CJRA, 49 ALA. L. REV. 251, 253 (1997) (arguing that judicial 
resistance to change was a primary reason why CJRA resulted in no measurable effect on litiga-
tion delay). 
TT Heise, supra note 15, at 822. See generally Priest, supra note 18, at 537 (describing 
how the interaction between court congestion and volume of litigation explains why litigation 
delay studies fail to demonstrate a systematic effect of reduced delay). 
28 See Heise, supra note 15, at 822. 
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sition, and party type, as well as certain case types, results, and char-
acter to be important variables.29 Professor Heise believes that an 
empirically grounded understanding of the attributes of case resolu-
tion time will help facilitate public policymaking and reforms that 
attempt to secure more expeditious, economical, and equitable civil 
justice.30 Professor Heise ascertains that the evaluation performed on 
the country's largest counties seriously challenges the effectiveness of 
recent civil justice reform endeavors, which emphasizes factors that 
do not affect case disposition time and which neglect additional fac-
tors that do significantly influence the civil justice system.31 For ex-
ample, the Civil Justice Reform Act prescribed, almost exclusively, 
process-oriented principles, guidelines, and techniques, as well as a 
number of related mechanisms, principally involving DCM and ADR, 
even though many state trial courts and numerous federal district 
courts had previously realized virtually all of the benefits to be ex-
tracted from these measures.32 Moreover, Congress apparently ig-
nored additional considerations, such as substantial criminal dockets 
and the prolonged periods re~uired to fill judicial vacancies, which 
can slow civil case resolution. 
Professor Heise concludes by summarizing and elaborating upon 
a number of the concepts examined above. He emphasizes that alter-
native approaches may warrant exploration when empirical data, as 
well as practical experience, demonstrate a particular course of ac-
tion's inefficacy. He carefully admonishes that assessors must un-
dertake greater empirical research before it will be possible to posit 
definitive determinations, especially if empirical "data rather than 
impressions or anecdotes are to inform public policy and reform ef-
29 See id. at 824-27. See generally infra note 65 and accompanying text 
30 See Heise, supra note 15, at 817. See generally FED. R. Crv. P. 1 (requiring that the 
rules "be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action"); Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Ex-
ample of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 15 B.U. L REV. 1325 (1995) (examining the prob-
lem presented by a rule, such as Rule 1, that attempts to provide direction on the basis of over-
arching values); Carl Tobias, The New Ceniorari and a National Study of the Appeals Couns, 
81 CORNELLL REv. 1264, 1286 n.90 (1996) (assessing the ideals of Rule 1 and suggesting that 
they should apply equally to appellate courts). 
31 See Heise, supra note 15, at 817-18, 848. See generally McArthur, supra note 23, at 
633-38 (suggesting randomly assigned pilots to control for selection bias in the CIRA project). 
32 See supra note 8 and accompanying text 
33 See, e.g., U.S. DISfRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ADVISORY 
GROUP REPoRT pt II (1991) (discussing the impact of the criminal docket on trial delay); U.S. 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISfRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, ADVISORY GROUP REPORT 
AND REcOMMENDED PLAN 57-58 (1992) (assessing impact of criminal docket, new legislation, 
and executive action on litigation delay); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 21-22 (1996). But cf. 28 
U.S.C. § 472(c)(l) (1994) (requiring districts to analyze criminal dockets as a part of civil jus-
tice reform). 
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forts in the future."34 Professor Heise specifically calls for the sys-
tematic collection, examination, and synthesis of cross-sectional data, 
of increased data from additional federal and state jurisdictions over 
larger time periods, and of data on parties' settlement activity.35 He 
asserts that information such as this will appreciably enhance com-
prehension of the civil justice system and help reformers who attem~t 
to improve the process by decreasing resolution time for civil cases. 
II. How JUSTICE DELAYED? INCREASES OUR UNDERSTANDING OF 
RECENT REFORMS 
Professor Heise's recent article contributes substantially to ap-
preciation of the contemporary federal and state civil justice systems 
in the United States. Justice Delayed? correspondingly increases our 
understanding of modem civil justice reform efforts, and in particular 
of the two procedural public policy initiatives instituted by Congress 
and the federal rule revision entities during the 1990s. 
A. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
Justice Delayed? demonstrates that the explicit congressional 
purpose in passing the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 was to re-
strict expense and delay in civil lawsuits through the application of 
numerous procedural measures. The legislation was passed, even 
though it was unclear that cost or delay was sufficiently problematic 
to deserve remediation or that process-oriented change was the best 
solution. A substantial number of the six principles, guidelines, and 
techniques as well as additional measures that Congress prescribed 
(particularly DCM and ADR) had already received application in 
many states and quite a few districts, and much of this experimenta-
tion demonstrated the limitations inherent in those procedures' appli-
cation. The previous testing in the state and federal courts indicated 
34 Heise, supra note 15, at 848. Accord Herbert Kritzer et al., Rule 11: Moving Beyond 
the Cosmic Anecdote, 15 JUDICATURE 269 (1992) (finding that assertions regarding the effects 
of amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been biased by anecdotes of 
large, unrepresentative federal cases); Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other 
Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution; Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 
366, 367 (1986) (arguing that the impact of any method of judicial resolution be verifiable by 
accepted empirical research techniques). 
35 See Heise, supra note 15, at 848-49. See generally CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA 
F. X. LITRAS, BUREAU JUST. STAT., CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1996: CIVIL 
TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (1999) (providing preliminary findings 
from a study expanding the 1992 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts); Burbank, supra note 26, 
at 240 (calling for research into the rate and timing of settlement). 
36 See Heise, supra note 15, at 849. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experi-
ments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REY. 1567, 1584 (1991) (arguing that 
local rule promulgation with collection of empirical data in specific districts is the most cost-
effective method of experimentation); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Pro-
posal for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (same). 
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and the CJRA undertaking apparently reaffirms that the state and fed-
eral judiciaries have achieved practically all of the expense and delay 
reduction that can be achieved with process-based reforms. Indeed, 
non-procedural approaches-including augmentation of the federal 
judiciary' s resources, alteration of court structure or court administra-
tion, such as the individual calendaring system, or change in the pres-
ent American adversarial system-would more efficaciously secure 
additional, meaningful fiscal and temporal economies. 37 
Professor Heise confirms the suggestions of other federal court 
observers that Congress neglected or underestimated several impor-
tant factors that are responsible for, or could decrease, cost and delay 
.in civil disputes. For instance, some individuals, namely federal dis-
trict judges and certain entities participating in the CJRA endeavor, 
remarked that criminal prosecutions are a substantial source of ex-
pense and delay, a factor that Congress effectively ignored,38 while 
other people and institutions indicated that more expeditious confir-
mation of nominees for judicial vacancies on the district courts would 
save significant financial and temporal resources.39 
The ideas in the two paragraphs above illustrate that there may 
be insufficient communications, both among individuals and entities 
responsible for civil justice reform in the branches of the federal gov-
ernment and between those people and institutions and their counter-
parts in state governments. If Congress, for example, had been more 
attentive to the perspectives of numerous federal judges or had con-
sidered more fully procedural experimentation that many states and a 
number of federal districts had conducted, lawmakers inight have re-
lied less substantially on process-oriented reforms, which proved 
rather ineffective, and perhaps prescribed other, comparatively effec-
tive measures. 
Justice Delayed? also demonstrates that after public policymak-
ers commission empirical data, they must carefully consult and thor-
oughly employ this information when implementing decisions about 
37 See Tobias, supra note 8, at 599. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 67 (finding that "the cost of litigation [i]s driven by factors other than judicial case 
management procedures"); McArthur, supra note,23, at 633-40 (arguing for the introduction of 
a more structured program). 
38 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
39 See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT 
OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP pt. ll(C)(2)(a) (1991) ("These problems 
will recur, however, if future judicial vacancies are not promptly filled ..•• "); U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM ADVISORY GROUP pt. II(B)(l-2) (1991) (noting that expense and delay has been caused 
by failure to fill promptly judicial vacancies as they arise). See generally Kim Dayton, Judicial 
Vacancies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
757 (1993); Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 
EMORY LJ. 527 (1998) (offering suggestions for implementation of alternatives to alleviate the 
problem). 
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procedural change. For instance, Congress authorized several com-
prehensive assessments of the CJRA experimentation, but seemingly 
failed to consider and capitalize on the results derived from the analy-
ses undertaken. Even Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), the en-
actment's foremost proponent and the member of Congress for whom 
the legislation was named,40 apparently could muster so little interest 
in the statute by the conclusion of its application that he sponsored a 
provision which continued only CJRA's case reporting require-
ments.41 It even remains unclear whether the legislation that lawmak-
ers ostensibly scheduled to expire seven years after its 1990 passage 
has actually reached "sunset."42 Indeed, during 1995, Republican 
House members introduced a number of proposals as part of the Con-
tract With America before the legislative branch had received an,x 
evaluations of the 1990 enactment that Congress had commissioned. 3 
Several provisions of the legal reforms included in the Contract 
would have imposed substantive and procedural changes that eclipsed 
certain features of CJRA. 
B. The 2000 Federal Rule Revisions 
Justice Delayed? similarly increases comprehension of the re-
cent rule revision proceeding culminating in the Supreme Court's 
promulgation of the 2000 amendments related to civil discovery. Pro-
fessor Heise illustrates the compelling need for public policymakers 
to commission expert, independent evaluations that systematically 
gather, analyze, and synthesize dependable empirical data, as well as 
the need to examine closely and deploy carefully the material col-
lected as a predicate for procedural decision-making. For example, 
when the empirical data requested by the Discovery Subcommittee of 
the Advisory Committee suggested that discovery was generally 
working well and presenting substantial difficulties in rather few 
40 See Tobias, supra note I, at 1599-1602. See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress 
and the Couns: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285 (1994). 
41 See Act of Oct 6, 1997, Pub L. No. 105-53, § 2, Ill Stat. 1173 (1997). See generally 
Edward Cavanagh, Congress's Failed Attempt to Spur Efficiency: The Legacy of the Civil Jus-
tice Refonn Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at 28. In fairness, Congress did pass the Alter-
native Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, which lawmakers apparently intended to institutionalize 
certain facets of CJRA experimentation. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (Supp. 1998). 
42 See Carl Tobias, Did the Civil Justice Refonn Act of 1990 Actually Expire?, 31 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 887 (1998) (arguing that Congress should proclaim that the act has expired, 
ending the uncertainty). See also Patrick Longan, Congress, the Corms, and the Long Range 
Plan, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 625, 655-56 (1997) (stating that once the national implications are 
clear, Congress should require districts to stop using individualized plans). 
43 See H.R. IO, 104th Cong. (1995) (introducing a bill to reform the federal civil justice 
system). See generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (1995); Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Refonns, 48 V AND. L. REv. 
699, 721-34 (1995) (setting forth an analysis of the proposals contained in the Common Sense 
Legal Reforms Act). 
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comparatively complicated cases,44 the rule revision entities should 
have consulted several alternative means of proceeding. The revisers 
might have considered more seriously the prospects of postponing 
amendment or rejecting change altogether. At the least, the revisors 
should have entertained the possibility of tailoring procedural modifi-
cation to the problems created by the relatively limited number of 
complex lawsuits, rather than adopting alterations that applied to 
every case.45 It is also important to realize that even the assessments 
that evaluators performed examined the operation of the existing dis-
covery requirements, such as the 1993 provision that imposed man-
datory prediscovery disclosure, instead of experiplenting with the 
measures that the Supreme Court eventually prescribed during 2000, 
to understand how they would function in practice.46 
C. General Ideas 
Both the experiences of Congress in passing CJRA and of the 
federal rule revisors when promulgating the 2000 civil procedure 
amendments demonstrate that relevant public policymakers appropri-
ately commissioned empirical assessments, albeit at different time 
periods. In fairness, Congress had the benefit of an evaluation un-: 
dertaken by the Foundation For Change and of additional analyses, 
but it is unclear how systematically those conducting the assessments 
collected, evaluated, and synthesized applicable empirical data, and 
how substantially Congress relied on the analyses in drafting CJRA.47 
Moreover, Congress properly commissioned empirical assessments of 
the experimentation that districts implemented pursuant to CJRA. 
44 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
45 See MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION § 21.4 (3d. ed. 1995) (tailoring procedures by 
case types}. See generally Levin, supra note 22, at 898-99 (recognizing that some types of cases 
need "specialized treatment"); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery 
Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994) 
(arguing that discovery rules should be drafted to meet the unique needs of different types of 
cases). 
46 For suggestions on how the federal rule revisers might conduct such experimentation, 
see Levin, supra note 36. See also Carl Tobias, A Modest Reform for Federal Procedural 
Rulemaking, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 2 (forthcoming Spring 2001); Walker, supra 
note 36 (arguing that the processes guiding development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in the past are no longer appropriate). See generally Tobias, supra note 14, at 85-90 (offering 
specific suggestions for future remedies through legislation). 
47 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN L. REV. 1393, 
1410-21 (1994) (asserting that such studies were based on "soft social science methodologies," 
and thus inadequate); Tobias, supra note l, at 1601-02 (stating that many judges were con-
cerned that there had been insufficient consultation with the judiciary in preparing the reports 
and assessing the efforts of the Foundation For Change). See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong. 13-14 (1990) (praising the reports, stating that "[t]he 
committee is indebted to the members of the task force for the comprehensive nature of their 
recommendations"). 
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However, Congress essentially ignored the results of the evaluations 
that the RAND Corporation and the Judicial Conference completed.48 
The federal rule revision entities also aptly undertook assess-
ments of the procedural provisions that they contemplated altering 
before proposing modification.49 Perhaps those responsible for 
studying the rules and formulating recommendations for improvement 
recognized that the 1983 amendment in Rule 11 became the most 
controversial change over the six-decade history of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure partly because the revision entities had gathered no 
empirical data on the provision's operation prior to altering the 1938 
version.50 The rule revisors may have similarly appreciated that the 
substantial controversy surrounding the 1993 amendment of Rule 26 
requiring mandatory prediscovery disclosure was attributable to lim-
ited understanding about how that procedure would actually work.51 
Thus, although decision-makers in Congress and in the Judicial Con-
ference rule revision committees correctly called for studies, they 
should then have seriously considered and used the findings of the 
evaluations when developing public policy in the procedure field.52 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE 
The analysis above shows the important need for additional 
studies of the type that Professor Heise has conducted, as well as for 
assessments like those commissioned by Congress under CJRA and 
48 See supra notes 33, 38 and accompanying text. 
49 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. Even those studies analyzed how the 
existing federal civil rules operated, not how the revisions the Court eventually prescribed 
would work in practice by experimenting with the proposed amendments first. See supra note 
46 and accompanying text. 
so See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transfonnation of American Civil Procedure: The 
Example of Rule JI, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989) (finding that Rule 11 was controver-
sial partly because "there is a conflict between or among circuits on practically every important 
question of interpretation and policy under the Rule"); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Re-
fonnfor Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 455, 455-59 (1993) (stating that the 
Advisory Committee's note explaining the change does not make any reference to empirical 
research). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 1606-17 (noting that the 1983 revision to Rule 
11 was sharply criticized, despite a comprehensive analysis by the Advisory Committee). 
51 See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Re-
fonn, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 28-32 (1992) (asserting that many lawyers felt the amendment would 
actually increase costs and delay); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Infor-
mal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 820-21 (1991) (finding that 
many research issues regarding the revision are unresolved). See generally Carl Tobias, Dis-
covery Refonn Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1999) (arguing that the revision was 
problematic because the revisors had minimal empirical data and little experience with the prac-
tical application of the procedure). 
52 Developments implicating time to disposition and potential reform, which resemble 
those involving the federal district courts, have occurred in federal appeals courts. Professor 
Heise, however, minimally mentions appellate court resolution times or possible reform, and 
those phenomena are beyond the scope of this response, even though Justice Delayed? does 
enhance appreciation of the developments. For exposition of some relevant ideas related to the 
appellate courts, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
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the Advisory Committee pursuant to its rule revision authority. Those 
with responsibility for reform of procedure must commission expert, 
independent evaluators that systematically assemble, analyze, and 
synthesize empirical data relevant to procedural decision-making, 
while policymakers should consult and apply these studies and base 
reforms on the assessments' results. The CJRA experimentation and 
the rule amendment proceeding that underlay the 2000 federal rule 
revisions, as well as state civil justice reform efforts and endeavors 
similar to the NCSC-BJS study on which Professor Heise relied, have 
generated a substantial quantity of informative empirical data, Deci-
sion-makers must capitalize on this material in formulating proce-
dures for civil litigation in the twenty-first century.s3 
It bears reiteration that even the finest empirical data alone will 
not foster improvement, unless procedural policymakers consider and 
employ the information that evaluators have collected. Illustrative are 
developments in the 1990s involving CJRA, the 2000 federal rules 
amendments discussed above,s4 and experiences implicating the fed-
eral appellate courts. With regard to the appeals courts, numerous 
observers holding quite diverse perspectives have found, and consid-
erable empirical data have shown, that the tribunals have lacked re-
sources to treat caseload increases.ss Notwithstanding information 
indicating that the courts have delivered less appellate justice, Con-
gress has evinced reluctance to reduce appeals by limiting jurisdic-
tion.s6 Congress has also been reluctant to address docket growth by 
expanding relevant resources, such as the authorization of additional 
judgeships or court administrative staff.s7 Lawmakers should reex-
53 They must also capitalize on a recent study that collected much valuable empirical data 
on the appellate system. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
54 See supra notes 1-14, 37-46 and accompanying text , • 
SS See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE 
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994); CHRISfOPHER BANKS, JUDICIAL Pm.mes IN THE D.C. 
CIRCUIT COURT 126-29 (1999) (stating that strategies employed by the appellate courts have 
been insufficient to treat the caseload crisis); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (finding that inevitable changes must be made in the appellate courts to 
deal with the increasing volume of cases). But see CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, CHAIRMAN'S 
REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE AilOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS (1999) (asserting that the appellate courts do not need additional judges to handle 
appeals). 
56 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. 
L REY. 29; 34-37 (1990) (stating that such proposals are controversial and unlikely); Boyce F. 
Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L J. 177, 181 (1999) (arguing 
that changes must be made in the opinion output of courts because Congress will not limit juris-
diction). See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 77-84 (addressing the appropri-
ate jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
57 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 55, at 1-30 (evaluating the histocy of the courts of appeals 
and their state today); BANKS, supra note 55, at 126-29 (arguing that the better solution is to 
increase the capacity of the appellate courts). These and other federal courts observers attribute 
legislative reluctance partly to political considerations. 
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amine this important situation and prescribe measures to rectify or 
ameliorate the circumstances. 
Several ideas already enumerated suggest the need for greater 
and better communications among officials with responsibility for 
decision-making about procedure in various entities of the state and 
federal governments. For instance, Congress should have more 
closely consulted the procedural experimentation in numerous states 
and federal districts before prescribing certain civil justice reform 
measures during 1990.58 The federal rule revisors in proposing, and 
the Supreme Court in promulgating, the 1983, 1993, and 2000 
amendments should similarly have commissioned and considered ad-
ditional relevant data, particularly on the operations of the procedures 
that the Court ultimately adopted, before effectuating change.59 
These actions could have led to the implementation of new provisions 
that were more efficacious and less controversial. State officials and 
institutions should correspondingly examine experimentation that the 
federal courts and other states conduct. For example, states in the 
South and West, which have encountered rapid population growth 
and escalating caseloads, might review the efforts to treat mounting 
dockets with few resources instituted by the larger federal appeal 
courts and the large counties scrutinized in Justice Delayed?60 
Public policymakers at the federal and state levels as well as 
evaluators and scholars may also want to elaborate upon the findings, 
assertions and raw data which Professor Heise has offered. For in-
stance, comparing the large counties in the state systems with federal 
districts in the same locale could prove productive. More specifi-
cally, Professor Heise's determination that Fairfax County, Virginia 
compiled the fastest civil case disposition time of the seventy-five 
counties at the state level61 correlates with Fairfax's location in one of 
the most expeditious federal districts, the Eastern District of Vir-
58 See supra notes 8, 32-33, 38-39 and accompanying text. Indeed, one reason for the 
CJRA's passage may have been insufficient communication between lawmakers and federal 
judges who comprise a majority on most Judicial Conference rule revision committees. See, 
e.g., Linda S. Mullinex, The Counter-Refonnation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REY. 375, 
386, 407-09 (1992); Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 114-16. See generally Robert G. Bone, The Proc-
ess of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 
GEO. LI. 887, 902-07 (1999) (criticizing the current rulemaking process); Tobias, supra note 8, 
at 622-25 (explaining tensions that arise during rule revision). 
59 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. . 
60 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 30-32 (describing caseload problems in the 
Ninth Circuit); Heise, supra note 15, at 836-38 (evaluating data for case disposition time based 
on locale). See generally Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferabl~ Approach for the Ninth 
Circuit, 88 CALL. REV. 1657 (2000) (proposing a less disruptive approach than circuit-splitting 
for treating docket growth with few resources). 
61 See Heise, supra note 15, at 836-38. 
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ginia.62 Not surprisingly, Fairfield County, Connecticut, the county 
that recorded the second slowest resolution time,63 is situated in the 
District of Connecticut, one of the federal trial courts that requires the 
greatest period to conclude civil lawsuits.64 These findings seem to 
reinforce the local legal culture hypothesis that phenomena, such as 
judicial practices, lawyers' ethics, and litigant strategic behavior in a 
specific geographic area, can usefully explain the pace of civil 
cases.65 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Delayed? contributes substantially to our understanding 
of the contemporary federal and state civil justice systems. Professor 
Heise affords instructive insights on the importance of having proce-
dural policymakers commission expert, independent evaluators to 
collect, analyze, and synthesize empirical data. He further denotes 
the importance of insuring that decisionmakers closely consult and 
carefully apply the material assembled when reforming civil justice. 
The author also aptly contends that there must be considerable, addi-
tional rigorous assessment of the civil justice systems before it will be 
possible to reach definitive conclusions about precisely how they op-
erate and might be improved. 
62 See ADMINISTRATNE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 1999, at 166 tbl. C-5 (1999). See generally Kim Dayton, Case Management in 
the Eastern District of Virginia, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 445 (1992); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery 
Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 
U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 205-07 (1992) (presenting the Eastern District of Virginia as a model of 
success for expediting resolution). 
63 See Heise, supra note 15, at 837 tbl.5. 
64 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 62, at 166 tbl. C-5 (1999). 
See generally U.S. DISfRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, REPORT OF THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP (1993). 
65 See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION 
IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 54 (1978) (suggesting that speed and backlog may be a result of ex-
pectations, practices, and informal rules of behavior of both judges and lawyers within the local 
culture); MAHONEY ET AL, supra note 19, at 87-89 (examining the affects of practitioner atti-
tudes and expectations on court delay); Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy Disunionism in 
the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 944-47 (1996) (describing differences caused by "proce-
dural localism"); Robel, supra note 1, at 1483-85 (arguing for a more cautious approach to local 
decision making). See also Heise, supra note 15, at 826-27, 836-37 (describing the effects of 
locale on variations in case disposition time). But see Herbert Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, 
Local Legal Culture and the Control of litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 535 (1993) (arguing 
that variation among districts is a result of structural and situational differences rather than local 
legal culture). ' 
